This paper evaluates three energy-sector market transformation programs: the Environmental Protection Agency's on-going Green Lights program to promote on-grid efficient lighting, the World Bank Group's new Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative, and the federal grain ethanol subsidy. We develop a benefit-cost model that uses experience curves to estimate unit cost reductions as a function of cumulative production. Accounting for dynamic feedback between the demand response and price reductions from production experience raises the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of the first two programs substantially. The BCR of the ethanol program, however, is approximately zero, illustrating a technology for which subsidization was not justified. Our results support a broader role for market transformation programs to commercialize new environmentally attractive technologies, but the ethanol experience suggests moderately funding a broad portfolio composed of technologies that meet strict selection criteria.
Introduction
In the classic linear model of innovation, scientific research generates new technologies which industry subsequently commercializes (Bush, 1945 (Bush, , reprinted 1990 . The causal flow runs from R&D to innovation, price reductions, and finally an increase in demand. In practice, continuous incremental innovation blurs the distinction between existing and new technologies and much useful innovation derives from the interplay between research and learning-by-doing (Arrow 1962 , Cohen and Noll 1991 , and Stokes 1997 . This complex causality, and the fact that private R&D investment often far exceeds public R&D expenditures, suggests that governments may be able to encourage innovation by "steering" market demand rather than relying exclusively on trickle-down effects from public R&D (Grubb 1997) .
A significant economics literature addresses the possible welfare-increasing role of market interventions in the presence of learning-by-doing that spills over among firms (Arrow 1962 , Spence 1981 and Stokey 1986 . When the benefits of learning are not appropriable, learning becomes a positive externality and firms fail to produce enough in each period to maximize efficiency over the entire production period. Moreover, as we illustrate below, output is likely to fall short of the social optimum even if spillover levels are low. This follows because proprietary learning gives incumbent firms widening cost advantages over potential entrants, allowing early entrants to exercise market power.
Specific discussion of the policy implications of these production shortfalls has been limited; nonetheless, a growing number of market transformation programs (MTPs) have emerged.
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These programs boost demand in order to promote early commercialization of clean energy technologies which exhibit 1 Policy prescriptions have been made in support of infant industry protection against imports. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) , for example, identify circumstances that favor this argument. Irwin and Klenow (1994) show that infant industry arguments are not persuasive for the case of semiconductors by demonstrating that spillovers between different generations of memory chips are minimal and that there are significant international learning spillovers in that industry. The former implies that subsidies to promote learning yield only short-term benefits while the latter implies that domestic semiconductor subsidies are, at least in part, an international public good. The short-term benefits critique does not apply to the case studies in this paper and we address the international public goods issue by taking a global welfare maximization perspective.
substantial learning-by-doing.
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As such, they are creative attempts to reduce CO 2 and other emissions without the aid of energy taxes that are often politically difficult to impose.
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In addition to displacing environmental externalities, MTPs can improve social welfare by correcting the output shortfall associated with learning-by-doing.
Despite the growing significance of MTPs, formal assessments of their impact are scarce. In this paper, we develop a dynamic benefit-cost model and apply it to the World Bank Group's Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative (PVMTI), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Green Lights Program (GL) and the federal gasoline excise tax exemption for ethanol. PVMTI is a $30 million program expected to be operational by the end of 1998, GL is an on-going program that was launched in 1991 and has cost approximately $45 million to date, and the ethanol program has cost approximately $6 billion since it was initiated in 1978.
4
All three programs promote early and more extensive diffusion of technologies by boosting short-term demand; however, efforts to quantify their long-term market transformation impact have thus far been inadequate. Our model integrates theories of industrial learning and economic demand to address this gap, introducing a framework that should prove useful for analyzing other MTPs as well.
Our results indicate that both PVMTI and GL provide net social benefits even without accounting for environmental externalities-though the results are sensitive to parameter choice. We also show that PVMTI and GL induce substantial indirect demand effects which we define as the iterative positive feedback between increased demand and learning-induced decreases in unit costs. Accounting for these effects increases the apparent cost-effectiveness of both programs. We define the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) as the present value of the stream of benefits generated by each program divided by the present value 2 The Clinton administration's Climate Change Action Plan relies heavily on a range of MTPs including the Green Lights program reviewed herein. Note that MTPs can take a wide range of forms. Krause (1996) defines market transformation to describe policies that reduce the environmental externalities associated with energy consumption via any means other than raising prices. We define MTPs narrowly as programs that attempt to commercialize new clean energy technologies by boosting short-term demand. 3 For example, in 1993, the Clinton Administration proposed a broad-based energy tax but retreated in response to a sharp political backlash. In fact, rather than optimal externalities taxes, on a global basis, fossil fuel subsidization is the rule, Gray (1995) . 4 World Bank Group (1996) and authors' estimate based on data from USEPA (1997) and GAO(1997). of the stream of costs (using the initial year of each program as the present value reference point). For our base case, including indirect demand effects, the BCR is 1.54 for GL and 1.05 for PVMTI. Including a modest carbon offset benefit ($10/tC), the figures increase to 2.64 for GL and 1.16 for PVMTI.
In contrast, the BCR of the ethanol program is approximately zero. Even after 20 years of massive support, the ethanol market would collapse without the federal subsidy, thus it has yet to produce social benefits; and, if continued at present levels the program will not begin to produce net annual benefits until after 2013.
This analysis raises the possibility of a broader role for MTPs in national and international technology policies designed to promote productivity growth; however, as the ethanol program illustrates, the costs resulting from poor program design, inefficient implementation or simply choosing the "wrong" technologies could easily outweigh cost reduction benefits. It is critical, therefore, to select technologies that are characterized by: 1) excellent prospects for long-term market penetration once subsidies end; 2) the potential for relatively fast cost reductions as indicated by a favorable progress ratio and relatively low cumulative production to date; 3) elastic market demand; and, 4) public access to high-quality data about all of the above.
As underscored by the wide range of BCRs in our sensitivity analysis, the information constraint is severe. We therefore add a fifth criterion: the capacity to displace substantial social externalities (e.g. environmental or military security). This ensures that scarce MTP funds have the best odds of increasing social welfare, even if the government makes an inaccurately high estimate of the production shortfall attributable to learning-by-doing. Similarly, this fifth criterion gives insurance against the risk that program costs prove to be higher than expected. Criteria one and five, taken together with the growing consensus that climate change is a major long-term threat, argue for prioritizing clean energy technologies-and this is our focus throughout the paper. This strategy also helps the government to protect and magnify the benefits from its investments in clean energy technology R&D.
These five conditions are restrictive. Computer processor manufacturing, for example, would do well on the second and third criteria; however, there is no clear social externality benefit from subsidizing Intel so it fails the fifth criterion. More importantly, Intel releases faster processors frequently and at varying intervals. Thus, a MTP for Intel also fails to meet the first criterion.
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It would be difficult for the government to design a sufficiently agile MTP without having enough data to construct a reliable experience curve or knowing precisely how much time was left before the processor it was currently supporting would be displaced.
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For its part, ethanol failed most notably on the first count; however, it also under-performed in terms of the third and fourth criteria. All of these problems were to some extent predictable (and some would argue that the ethanol program was simply "pork barrel" politics from the start); however, ex ante information is never perfect. For example, our GL assessment is retrospective. This analysis could have been done prospectively; however, it would have been necessary to assume a value for the experience curve used for electronic ballasts. The government should acknowledge these intractable uncertainties and support a broad portfolio of technologies all of which conform to the five criteria outlined above and each one of which receives modest support. This mitigates the risk that its overall MTP effort will yield a net social welfare loss.
Learning and Experience Curves

Learning Curve Theory
Learning curves, most narrowly defined, describe the relationship between cumulative production and the marginal labor cost of a given product manufactured by a specific firm. T.P Wright introduced formal learning curve 5 For example, the time between new generations of Intel processors has varied from one year to four years since the original 4004 processor was released in 1971. 6 The problem is compounded by the fact that Intel could strategically convince the government that the next generation processor would not be ready until after the actual planned release. Also, for each new processor Intel starts out with strong market power, but it rapidly declines as its competitors catch up. Consequently, the markup of price above marginal cost would change quickly, preventing the government from estimating the progress ratio without access to proprietary production cost data.
analysis in a 1936 study of airplane manufacturing.
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The conceptual foundation for learning curve theory is that production experience facilitates worker skill improvements, and that benefits accrue in proportion to cumulative production. In a conventional formulation:
where MC(q(t))=unit cost given cumulative production at time t, the parameter a=the cost of a unit at t=0, the parameter q(0)=cumulative production by the firm at t=0, and b=the rate of innovation, or the learning parameter. 8 Note that if cumulative production is exactly one unit at t=0 then Equation (1) collapses to the simple
form. We define unit cost as equivalent to the discrete version of long-run marginal cost, i.e. the marginal unit cost assuming that capital investment levels are allowed to vary. Also, we assume throughout the paper that discrete units are small enough that unit and marginal cost concepts can be used interchangeably.
The underlying intuition for this exponential relationship is that there are diminishing returns to learning. Progress is fast initially, but tapers off as worker productivity becomes optimized. The equation can be linearized to facilitate ordinary least squares regression analysis:
The conventional measure of learning is the progress ratio (Argote and Epple 1990, Dutton and Thomas 1984) . For each doubling of cumulative production the cost per unit decreases by (1-PR) percent. The derivation is straightforward:
During the 1970s, Boston Consulting Group (BCG) introduced the experience curve concept which generalizes the labor productivity learning curve to include all costs necessary to research, develop, produce and market a given product (Boston Consulting Group, 1972) . BCG presented evidence that most of its clients benefited from a predictable percentage reduction in overall costs associated with every doubling of cumulative production. That is, BCG argued that learning-by-doing occurs not only in the narrow sense of labor productivity improvements, but also in associated R&D, overhead, advertising and sales expenses. These efficiency gains, in conjunction with the benefits from economies of scale, often yield cost reductions that can be characterized by an experience curve with the same functional form as equation (1), except that
MC(q(t))
incorporates all production costs. Dutton and Thomas (1984) , compiled over 100 firm-level studies from a variety of manufacturing sectors that confirm that this is a consistently strong relationship and suggest a mean progress ratio of 80%. The authors caution, however, that there is substantial PR variability both within and across industries, products and processes-and they underscore that other variables also drive cost reductions.
A fundamental assumption in the experience curve functional form is that cumulative production levels drive MC. This is problematic to the extent that there are also economies of scale (EOS), defined as a decline in MC driven by an increase in the level of current production. In reality, however, EOS only explain some fraction of the observed unit cost reductions over time for any given technology, and Lieberman (1987) cites an empirical literature suggesting that learning effects typically dominate EOS in driving cost reductions. Hall and Howell (1985) argue that, in addition to economies of scale, cost reductions are driven by four factors: 1) technological progress; 2) input price changes; 3) internal efficiency improvements; and 4) learning-bydoing. They further contend that except for the last two factors "any correlation [with accumulated output] would be at least partly spurious." We acknowledge these caveats, but emphasize the broader experience curve nonetheless because of the importance of use-inspired process and technological innovations.
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Moreover, we contend that, temporary shortages and exogenous noise aside, higher levels of cumulative production will tend to drive down key input prices (e.g. for specialized machinery) as suppliers gain production experience and reach economies of scale.
We therefore assume that, for a broad range of new technologies, cumulative industry production determines unit costs, i.e. equation (1) applies with unit cost as the dependent variable. 10 This is a critical assertion underlying both the prima facia case for MTPs and our benefit-cost analyses. The BCR estimates for our case studies will be biased to the extent that EOS (and other omitted variables such as firm-specific learning) drive unit costs. Ghemawat and Spence (1984) as well as Irwin and Klenow (1994) discuss empirical strategies for distinguishing proprietary learning from industry-wide learning; however, it is not possible to estimate economies of scale or firm-specific learning without data that are not publicly available for our cases. We can, however, at least test the sensitivity of our PR estimates to the inclusion of current industry production as a separate exogenous variable. While a poor proxy for firm-level production, to the extent that the number of producers and their relative shares remain stable, current industry production gives some indication of average production scale. Our data for GL and PV suggest that using cumulative production as the only independent variable is a good parsimonious model specification. For both GL and PV if we add the log of annual production to the regression model the associated coefficients are not significant (p-values of .496 and .276, respectively) , the log cumulative production terms remain significant (p-values of .001 and .049, respectively), and the residual experience effects are stronger (PR=0.77 vs. 0.82 and PR=0.84 vs. 0.89, respectively).
The corresponding analysis for ethanol suggests that the ethanol experience curve may be spurious since current industry production is a more significant determinant of price than cumulative production. Adding log of current production reverses the sign of the coefficient on the latter (yielding PR=1.32
9 Abell and Hammond (1979) use an analogous broad definition of experience while von Hippel (1988) provides evidence of pervasive user-driven innovation.
vs. PR=0.83). This suggests the true ethanol experience curve may be positively-sloped, and conforms with our negative assessment of this program.
As explained below, however, we do not need the ethanol experience curve for our principal conclusions in this case.
Environmental Externalities Rationale for MTPs
Emerging clean technologies generally displace polluting substitute technologies. The true social marginal cost (SMC) of a clean technology is therefore:
where ME refers to the social cost of the fossil fuel externalities displaced by a 
Experience Curve Rationale for MTPs
For certain rapidly growing markets, BCG counseled its clients to maximize long-run profits by setting current production higher than the short-run profitmaximizing level. Spence (1981) Figure 1 illustrates this concept using a total cost curve. When deciding how much to produce initially, a firm that has just begun producing a product should not consider its current unit cost MC(0), but rather the lower cost MC(q(T)) since that is the true cost of producing an extra unit at time 0, taking into account the entire production run from [0,T] .
Similarly, at each subsequent time t<T, the firm should recalculate MC(q(T)) and set MR(t)=MC(q(T)) rather than equating marginal revenue with current unit cost, MC(q(t)).
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The extent to which profit-maximizing firms have an incentive to pursue this strategy (hereafter called forward-pricing) depends on their ability to exclude competitors from experience benefits. A variety of mechanisms allow firms to cut costs based on their rivals' production experience. Among other channels, experience spillovers could result from hiring competitors' employees, reverse engineering rivals' products, informal contacts among employees of rival firms or even industrial espionage. For the extreme case in which spillover is and our analysis focuses on the early stages of production (except for ethanol which shows zero social benefits even without accounting for the possible slowing of learning). 11 Formally, Spence (1981) for N firms as cumulative industry output. We then substitute Q for q in equation (1) to obtain an "industry learning curve" or an "industry experience curve" (Figure 2 ). The former defines MC(Q(t)) as unit labor costs and therefore involves labor productivity learning only (e.g. from employee defections). The latter defines MC(Q(t)) as overall unit cost and therefore incorporates all forms of industry-wide learning-by-doing and economies of scale.
When the benefits of learning are not appropriable due to spillover, experience becomes a positive externality (analogous to the negative externality caused by environmental pollution) and firms fail to produce enough in each period to maximize industry efficiency over the entire production period. Ghemawat and Spence (1985) refer to this as the disincentive effect. There are, however, also inefficiencies associated with imperfect spillover. Incumbent firms that benefit from proprietary or partially proprietary learning-by-doing are able to gain ever-widening cost advantages over potential entrants. This creates a barrier to entry that allows the incumbent firm or firms to set price above the level at which marginal cost intersects demand. We refer to this as the market power effect. Finally, if spillover is not complete then production costs will be higher to the extent that any given level of industry output is divided among a larger number of firms. All else equal, dividing production by N firms is inefficient if spillover is less than 100% because, for any given progress ratio and fixed total cumulative production, equation (1) yields a higher MC(Q(t)) as N increases.
We call this the divided experience effect. Ghemawat and Spence (1985) show that for a typical industry characterized by learning or experience effects, industry output is always insufficient to achieve optimum social welfare-but net industry performance generally improves as spillover increases since reductions in inefficiency from the divided experience and market power effects dominate increases in DWL from the disincentive effect.
Our purpose in this section is to show that, divided experience effects aside, some combination of the market power and disincentive effects will generally cause output to fall short of the social optimum in every period (except T).
This provides a prima facia case for MTPs to correct the shortfall.
We do not suggest designing any MTPs to address the divided experience effect directly. If the government wanted to increase market concentration to improve the efficiency with which experience accrues, it would have to try to determine ex ante which firms would reduce costs most effectively. Also, to ensure that the benefit from reducing the DWL from divided experience would outweigh the market power costs, a policy that promoted greater market concentration would have to impose expensive price-regulating bureaucracies analogous to public utility commissions.
13 Given the inherent uncertainties and costs in any such effort, it would be inadvisable to consider policies that intentionally affect market concentration in response to divided experience effects.
14 Figure 3 illustrates the welfare implications of three cases for a hypothetical industry characterized by an experience curve: a) 100% spillover, N=∞; b) no spillover, N=1; and c) partial spillover, 1<N<∞. Our assumption of a univariate experience curve model implies constant returns to scale. To be consistent with this approach, we employ flat long-run marginal cost curves, denoted MC, and with long-run defined to mean that capital investment levels are allowed to vary. If experience effects were instantaneous, MC might decline slightly due to the effect on cumulative production of incremental increases in current production. We therefore assume a slight lag in experience effects to avoid uninformative complications from this second-order effect.
Thus, at any given time t ∈ [0,T], long-run marginal cost as a function of current output level is flat, but the entire MC schedule shifts down over time as cumulative output increases.
We also assume perfect information and we do not formally model strategic interactions and how they would affect market concentration over [0,T] .
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Nonetheless, the cases show a representative snapshot at some time t under a 13 Petrakis et al (1997) show an equilibrium unregulated outcome that maximizes social welfare by generating perfect competition despite learning under 0% spillover conditions. This result requires the assumption of decreasing returns to scale. We therefore ignore this case since decreasing scale economies are unlikely for our chosen technologies. 14 Kahn (1988) analyzes the circumstances under which regulated monopoly may be justified as a response to the natural monopoly conditions in industries exhibiting strong economies of scale. His analysis also highlights many of the pitfalls involved with implementing such regulation. 15 Majd and Pindyck (1989) argue that uncertainty about the level of future demand reduces the extent to which firms forward-price because producing beyond the point where MC(q(t))=MR(t) amounts to a sunk investment in future cost reductions. They acknowledge, however, that this result is partly contingent on assuming that firms can costlessly stop and start production in response to demand shocks. This uncertainty effect should not change our qualitative conclusions so we exclude it from our model for parsimony.
range of spillover rates. In all three cases, output is less than the social optimum, and this implies DWL.
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Assuming an industry experience curve (100% spillover) as shown in Figure   3a , experience effects do not give incumbent firms any unit cost advantage over potential entrants despite the incumbents' lead in cumulative production.
Thus, this case is consistent with perfect competition. However, with N firms, the marginal experience benefits for each one are only a 1/N fraction of the total marginal experience benefits. In the limit as N approaches infinity, experience becomes a pure public good and firms do not forward-price at all.
Formally,
where MC(q(t)) equals current unit cost excluding future experience effects. In Figure 3a , we illustrate this for N=∞ such that MC(q(T)) = MC(q(t)) for all firms, but the essential result holds for any sufficiently large N.
A social planner would increase each firm's production to the point where demand intersects MC(Q(T)), defined as the MC at the end of the production period calculated by substituting Q(T) into equation (1). In other words, the social planner would "internalize" the spillover externality by accounting for the benefit to all firms from each firm's experience. This policy would thereby eliminate the DWL associated with the disincentive effect.
17
Thus, as with environmental externalities, there is a clear economic rationale for considering a demand-boosting MTP for any technology characterized by an industry experience curve and 100% spillover.
16 Note that the figures are not drawn to scale and the relative position of the different cost schedules, and sizes of the respective DWL areas, are not necessarily representative. Also, the figures do not depict divided experience effects. 17 In theory, this intervention would achieve the first-best welfare maximizing outcome because there are also enough firms to ensure perfect competition (no DWL from the market power effect) and there is perfect spillover (no DWL from the divided experience effect).
In the other extreme case of 0% spillover, firms completely forward-price to maximize their profits (no DWL from the disincentive effect); however, output falls short of the social optimum because of some combination of the divided experience and market power effects. To illustrate the divided experience effect in terms of figure 3b, adding a second identical firm and splitting the same cumulative production from [0,t] between them would result in higher MC(q(t))
and MC(q(T)) schedules, and corresponding losses in social welfare. Spence (1981) formally demonstrates that if spillover is less than 100%, the first-best welfare outcome occurs when one firm produces everything and price is set equal to MC(q(T)) in every period. This firm would, however, take a loss in all periods but the last, and would therefore need government subsidies.
Without price regulations, if N is small then firms will have market power. For N=1 and 0% spillover, in each period, a monopolist produces at the quantity where
MR(t)=MC(q(T)). The use of MC(q(T)) rather than MC(q(t)) follows
from the fact that experience benefits are fully proprietary, so the firm optimally forward-prices. The equality derives from the standard first order conditions for oligopoly profit maximization (for which monopoly is a special case):
Define firm i's profit as, Profit maximization for each firm requires,
Defining ε p as in equation (7) while multiplying both sides by 1/P and the right-side by Q/Q,
where ε p is defined conventionally in absolute value terms so that larger negative ε p values are referred to as "higher elasticity" or "more elastic."
Equation (6) is the well-known result for the "structure-conduct-performance" model. The left hand side measures performance while the market share of the profit-maximizing firm, in conjunction with ε p , represent market structure.
The α i term gives an indication of conduct, defined as the way that firms react to each other's output levels (α i >0 implies that firms collude, α i <0 is the standard non-collusive case in which each firm reduces its output if other firms increase theirs, and α i =0 is the Cournot oligopoly case in which each firm takes all others' output level as fixed).
For the monopoly case, equation (6) collapses to (P-MC)/P = 1/ε p , the standard Lerner index result showing that both monopoly markup over marginal cost, and the associated DWL, are inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand.
For example, as drawn in Figure 3b , price falls between MC(q(t)) and
MC(q(T)), but this depends on the value of ε p in the region where MR(t) intersect MC(q(T)). Furthermore, setting ∂π/∂Q = 0 yields MC(Q) = P(Q) + Q
• ∂p/∂Q, where the right-hand side is defined as marginal revenue. Marginal revenue therefore has a steeper slope than demand since Q • ∂p/∂Q is negative and decreasing in Q for Q>0. As shown in Figure 3b ,
price exceeds MC(q(T)) at the q for which MR(t) = MC(q(T)).
Thus, if 0% spillover leads to monopoly or even just oligopoly, then there is a prima facia case for a MTP in order to increase the quantity demanded and thereby reduce the DWL from market power in every period. 
MC(Q(T)) < MC(q(T)) < MC(q(t)). Each firm's true marginal cost lies below its
current marginal cost creating some incentive to forward-price; however, they do not take into account the benefits from their production that spill over to their competitors, so their true marginal cost exceeds the true social marginal cost. The net effect generates a substantial production shortfall and thus, again, a possible rationale for intervening with a MTP.
Our analysis has thus far assumed exogenous firm entry levels under each of the three cases, and has neglected the strategic interactions among incumbent firms and potential entrants. These interactions determine the level of market concentration over [0,T] and the associated DWL from market power and/or divided experience effects. We now briefly consider this topic, emphasizing, however that no definitive analysis is possible without arbitrary assumptions.
Ross (1986) summarizes a substantial literature that uses Cournot assumptions, α i =0 in equation (6), to demonstrate that largely or completely proprietary learning generates market concentration. These models all show welfare falling below the first-best outcome because of some combination of divided experience and market power effects. Spence(1981) departs from Cournot assumptions, and with exogenous entry (subject to a profitability constraint) he also demonstrates a tradeoff between these two effects as N increases. He also shows that moderate rates of learning yield the worst barriers to entry and associated monopoly DWL. Ross (1986) assumes a Stackelberg leaderfollower model, α i <0 in equation (6), and demonstrates that, with 0% spillover, the first entrant in a new market can establish and hold a strongly dominant market position by maintaining a lead over incumbent and potential competitors in cumulative production experience. Smiley and Ravid (1983) Otherwise, incumbent firms should be able to use their proprietary experience to create market barriers. One could envision other scenarios such as an incumbent firm producing up to or even beyond the social optimum for a brief period in order to establish credibility. This is another case in which a MTP would actually hurt social welfare; however, it also seems an unlikely threat given the efficacy of limit pricing of the sort described by Smiley and Ravid.
The preceding discussion emphasizes that nearly any outcome is possible in the realm of oligopoly. Cases of highly unusual strategic behavior aside, however, this section has illustrated that there will be an output shortfall for all technologies characterized by a strong experience effect, regardless of the spillover level, ε p , or the progress ratio. A MTP can address this shortfall and reduce the associated DWL in each period.
In assessing GL and PVMTI we assume perfect competition and 100% spillover ( Figure 3a) . Data constraints preclude formal statistical tests of these assumptions; however, Lieberman (1987) discusses empirical evidence of spillovers as high as 60-90% in some cases and summarizes a substantial empirical literature suggesting high spillover rates. Nonetheless, it is likely that true spillover rates are somewhat less than 100%. This means that we overstate the extent to which experience is a public good, but we also understate the production shortfall attributable to market power. Moreover, to the extent that experience is proprietary, a MTP that favors a subset of young (mature) companies characterized by fast (slow) proprietary experience would yield cost reductions in excess of (below) those expected under the assumption of perfect spillover.
Clarifying the net effect of relaxing the perfect spillovers assumption is an important goal for future research; however, this uncertainty does not undermine our prima facia case for MTP intervention in any industry characterized by a strong industry experience curve. Evaluating real-world
MTPs requires a computational estimate of program benefits and costs. The following section develops a benefit-cost assessment methodology to achieve this.
Description of the Cost-Benefit Model
Deriving experience curves from price and production data
Where possible, it is preferable to define learning and experience curves using manufacturing cost; however, where these proprietary data are unavailable Lieberman (1984) argues that price provides a legitimate proxy if any of the following conditions hold:
1.Price/cost margins remain constant over time.
2.Price/cost margins change, but in a manner controlled for in the analysis.
3.Changes in margins are small relative to changes in production costs.
The third condition should hold for both PV and electronic ballasts since prices for both are falling briskly (the real price of electronic ballasts has fallen by over 60% since 1986 and the real price of PV modules has dropped by over 95% since 1975). Thus, changes in the price/cost margin should introduce only small deviations relative to the pronounced cost reduction trend. Over a decade of sales and price data are available for both PV and electronic ballasts, ensuring a relatively reliable empirical progress ratio estimate. For ethanol none of the three conditions clearly holds; however, our conclusions for that case do not depend on the accuracy of our ethanol progress ratio estimate.
To make the analysis tractable, for our first two case studies, we assume that the programs take place in competitive markets. This implies that all producers are earning zero economic rents (i.e. they are covering their fixed and marginal production costs and earning the market rate of return for similarly risky investments) and the mark up of price above long-run marginal cost should be stable at approximately zero.
Experience/Demand Feedback Effects
Two of the fundamental factors determining the market diffusion pattern for any new technology are the rate at which manufacturers are able to reduce costs with additional production and the responsiveness of market demand to any such cost reductions. For some industries, the former can be characterized by an experience curve, while the price elasticity of demand (ε p ) measures the latter. In discrete terms:
where q refers to annual production and P to price.
Our diffusion model assumes that: 1) the cost reduction due to incremental experience and the associated demand response occur within the one-year time step period; 2) there is no saturation effect; and, 3) a "contagion" or "free driver" effect also drives sales.
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Saturation during the time scale of our analysis should be of limited concern for PV since potential markets are orders of magnitude larger than current module sales (World Bank Group 1996).
Moreover, current sales of electronic ballasts represent only about one-third of total ballasts sold in the U.S., and there are immense potential export markets (USDOC, 1997). Similarly, current ethanol consumption amounts to only 18 Bass (1980) endogenizes experience curve and εp effects in order to predict diffusion patterns. To analyze the entire product life-cycle, he introduces a probability density function that measures time to purchase given a fixed price. The general pattern that he predicts is for annual production to increase at first and subsequently decline, whereas price decreases monotonically with time. His model accounts for the "social contagion of the adoption process" and it is driven by the assumption that firms will seek to maximize profits. Moreover, it assumes that demand will ultimately saturate.
about 1% of total gasoline sales in the U.S. The "contagion" effect assumes that, in the early stages of new product diffusion, potential users learn about a product by observing early adopters (Bass 1980 ) and Vettas 1998). Our model simulates this effect by using an exogenous percentage growth rate. Thus, the effect of early MTP-induced sales is magnified over time by becoming part of the annual base that determines future compound sales growth.
We underscore that our purpose is not to predict diffusion and price trends but rather to assess the marginal impact of MTPs. For PV, we generate a forecast of future cumulative production levels and the corresponding prices as determined by the empirical PV progress ratio. We define this as the business as usual (BAU) scenario. We then compare this to the "program" scenario where we add sales attributable to PVMTI to the baseline trajectory and use the empirical progress ratio to estimate the associated prices. For GL, we generate a "backcast" of predicted historical prices for electronic ballasts based on actual cumulative production levels, and treat this as the BAU scenario. We then subtract purchases attributable to GL and calculate the associated prices using the empirical industry progress ratio. This is called the "No GL" scenario. For all cases, we assume the empirical progress ratio is constant and completely determines prices.
The unique feature of this model is that it accounts for the indirect effects of MTPs. In particular, the model assumes that MTPs will induce a price reduction via the experience curve, which, in turn will induce a demand response that further reduces price. For each period, the model calculates the indirect effect using the standard discrete midpoint elasticity formula:
and we therefore have,
where ε p is exogenous and the subscripts bau and mtp refer to the Business as Usual and program scenarios, respectively. Cumulative production for each period, Q(t), equals the sum of current sales directly attributable to the MTP plus indirect demand effects, plus Q(t-1). Current price, accounting for indirect effects, is derived by substituting Q(t) into equation (2) and using the appropriate empirical experience parameter b, as defined by equation (3).
Estimation of Benefits and Costs
Figure 4 presents a simplified two-period illustration of our benefit estimation methodology. In the first period, a single-period MTP artificially inflates demand with a subsidy at least as large as the triangle marked 'minimum possible MTP cost.' As a result of associated experience benefits, the second period marginal cost is lower than it would have been in the BAU scenario.
The primary second period benefit from the MTP is equal to the price reduction times the production level at the unsubsidized second period price that would have prevailed without the first period MTP (the lightly shaded rectangle in Figure 4 ). To this we must add the benefit from the indirect demand effect (the darkly shaded triangle in Figure 4 ). The perfect competition assumption facilitates welfare estimation since it implies that producer surplus is fixed at zero. Consequently, to estimate program benefits we simply account for the change in consumer surplus. The flat MC schedules follow from the assumption of constant-returns to scale.
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In a multi-period analysis, a one-period MTP induces indirect demand effects in all future periods until the market saturates or unit cost approaches some non-zero minimum unit cost. We employ standard methodology to estimate the present value of this benefits stream, dividing the net benefits for each year by (1+r) n , where n refers to the number of years since the last expenditure for the program was disbursed. We select a fixed time horizon (n=20 years) and real social discount rate (r=.05), consistent with the historical real rate of return from moderately risky long-term investments (e.g. long-term investment-grade corporate bonds) (Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe 1996) . We then estimate the 19 As noted above, we define MC as long-run marginal cost, allowing capital investment levels to vary freely. We therefore make the further assumption that the one-year time step is sufficiently long for the industry to re-optimize its capital investment level in response to any demand increase due to a MTP. With upward sloping supply curves the lines currently labeled MC in Figure 6 would represent prices and still produce a trapezoidal increase in consumer surplus; however, the size of the short-run price drop from a given MTP would be smaller, as would the associated increase in consumer surplus. As long as producer surplus is fixed at approximately zero (i.e. profit on infra-marginal units exactly covers fixed costs) then the only other major effect would be that the minimum possible MTP cost for any given demand boost would be larger.
present value of the stream of program costs and then divide the present value of benefits by the present value of costs to yield the benefit-cost ratio (BCR).
For both benefit and cost present value calculations we use the initial year of the program as the reference point year.
For GL and PVMTI there is additional social value from reducing fossil fuel consumption and the associated environmental externalities. We therefore include a conservative carbon benefit ($10/tC) for both of these case studies.
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Following standard benefit-cost practice, we exclude transfer payments (e.g. utility demand-side management rebates for electronic ballasts) from our program cost estimates except to the extent that they induce purchases for which the social MC of production exceeds the marginal WTP (Folster, 1991) .
We also consider program administration expenditures to be social costs because they consume resources (e.g. skilled labor) rather than simply transferring wealth from one economic agent to anther.
There are a range of possible indirect effects besides the demand effect described above. One example is the DWL associated with any taxation necessary to finance MTPs. It is also possible that R&D induced by a MTP will effectively crowd-out R&D in other sectors. Folster (1991) MTPs will not be able to "price discriminate" among subsidy recipients.
Rather, the will have give all subsidy recipients the minimum per unit subsidy required to induce a purchase by the recipient with the lowest willingness to pay. MTPs may also give subsidies to "free riders" who would have purchased the targeted good without any subsidy. In particular, if a MTP expands to account for an ever-larger share of the overall market, beyond some size, free rider problems become unavoidable. Larger transfers due to these sorts of allocation inefficiencies increase the risk that the DWL of taxation necessary to finance the MTP will be substantial.
Poorly designed MTPs may even subsidize consumers' with relatively low willingness to pay (e.g. if they target the wrong geographic area). This implies a larger minimum possible MTP cost per induced purchase and involves higher transfers as well to the extent that the MTP fails to price discriminate and/or prevent free riders.
Finally, it is worth highlighting the links between our prima facia case for considering MTPs and our applied model. The model accounts for dynamic interactions between experience and demand. This effectively credits the MTP for overcoming the DWL associated with any disincentive effect due to spillover. However, the model also assumes perfect competition and spillover, so neither market power effects nor divided experience effects are explicitly modeled. Nonetheless, we would expect programs that involve large theoretical DWL from either experience spillovers or market power to represent better opportunities for strongly positive MTP payoffs.
For example, theory would predict that firms producing a technology characterized by high spillover would insufficiently forward-price. Thus, a MTP for this technology should generate strong benefits. This would show up in the model as a low ratio of direct demand effects to program costs-a detectable phenomenon for ex post analysis of the sort we undertake for the PVMTI and ethanol cases. For such a case, there should also be a strong indirect demand effect because the MTP would be pushing a technology that
has not yet been aggressively promoted by forward-pricing firms. This can never be empirically demonstrated; however, as with the ratio of direct demand effects to program costs, it is partially discernable ex ante through expert judgment (e.g. in estimating program costs, ε p , free rider rates, and exogenous growth rates).
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Comparison with other MTP evaluation methodologies USGAO (1997a) reviews the GL program; however, neither they nor the USEPA has published any estimate of the program's net benefits. Rather, the USGAO report focused on the extent to which GL has met its stated quantitative targets. The World Bank Group's projections for PVMTI attempt to estimate the impact of the program on future PV sales and prices; however, they do not model the dynamic impact including indirect demand effects.
In a review of MTP evaluations, Krause (1996) highlights the omission of various feedbacks as one of a number of factors leading to unduly pessimistic bias in assessing these programs. He does not, however, focus on how to quantitatively account for these benefits. Similarly Levine and Sonnenblick (1994) discuss free driver benefits in the context of utility demand-side management rebate programs. They define free driver benefits as adoption of energy efficient technology by non-participants in the rebate programs and develop a simple model that accounts for this contagion effect. They acknowledge, but do not attempt to quantify the dynamic "chain reaction" that this might produce. The indirect demand effect in our model accounts for this dynamic phenomenon.
Colombier and Menanteau (1997) explicitly refer to the possibility that MTPs can initiate a "virtuous circle" driven by the feedback between experienceinduced price reductions and demand; however, they do not present a methodology for quantifying such effects. Finally, Geller and McGaraghan (1998) discuss the role of conventional government R&D programs in developing the first prototype electronic ballasts. They also calculate an empirical progress ratio of approximately 0.9 for this industry; however, they make no mention of the effect of GL on this market and do not attempt to characterize dynamic indirect demand effects.
The same logic would imply the potential for a strong indirect demand effect for MTPs that target
In sum, there is growing recognition of the importance of MTPs and the role that dynamic feedback plays in improving their efficacy; however, we have not identified any other studies that introduce a methodology for quantifying these effects as part of an applied benefit-cost analysis.
The Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative
Photovoltaic (PV) modules convert sunlight into direct current electricity, which can either be used immediately or stored in rechargeable batteries.
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Individual PV module output is measured in peak watts (Wp) while industry production levels are measured in peak megawatts (MWp). Critical advantages of PV include that it produces very low life-cycle pollution and it can be used anywhere where there is adequate insolation.
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Consequently, PV has become commercially viable in many "off-grid" niche markets where utility power is unavailable (either because of administrative inefficiencies or the prohibitive cost of connecting dispersed rural customers to the transmission grid). In particular, there is a large market for 10Wp to 100Wp solar home systems (SHSs) in developing countries. A typical 50Wp system provides about 220
watt-hours/day, or enough to power basic lighting, television, radio and other miscellaneous small load appliances (e.g. brief daily use of a blender). About 500,000 SHSs have been installed, but there are an additional 300-400 million unelectrified households in developing countries (World Bank Group 1996) . At current prices, the potential SHSs market is only a fraction of the total number of unelectrified households. SHS prices observed during 1993-94 in various developing countries ranged from below $10/Wp to over $25Wp (Cabraal et al 1996) . A number of factors account for this divergence including different levels of local market infrastructure, import tariffs, system quality differences, and subsidy programs.
technologies for which producers have substantial market power. 22 See Johansson et al (1993) for comprehensive background on the technology. With an inverter, PV power can be converted into alternating current for use with conventional appliances or transmission over utility grids.
PVMTI is funded by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the
Global Environment Facility (GEF):
…to significantly accelerate the commercialization, market penetration, and financial viability of PV technology in the developing world…it is believed that PVMTI will provide market signals that spur manufacturing expansion and distribution infrastructure and help achieve accelerated manufacturing cost reductions…
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Conspicuously absent from project documents are any quantitative estimates of PVMTI's impact on module prices. In this section, we use the benefit-cost model introduced above to evaluate PVMTI. We conclude that the program is too small to have a major effect on the rapidly expanding global PV market; nonetheless, even using our conservative base case assumptions, PVMTI is cost-effective. This supports expansion of PVMTI or other MTPs which target PV.
GEF is providing $30 million in PVMTI funding that is expected to cover $5 million in program administration costs and to leverage an additional $60 million in co-financing-yielding a total of $85 million for PV investments.
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PVMTI became operational in the fall of 1998 and its scheduled duration is five to seven years. GEF intends to recover $13.5 million of its original investment and we assume that, in conjunction with reinvested capital and profits from cofinancing partners, GEF's recovered capital would be sufficient to extend the project through 2018. We assume that GEF recovers nothing at the end of the 20 year period analysis period, and conservatively treat the full $30 million as an up-front social cost (this is consistent with GEF's goal of financing incremental costs only). This allows non-GEF investors to recover their principal plus a market return, so we do not include the co-financing amount in our estimate of social costs. Our model applies all $85 million in available PVMTI funds towards a revolving loan fund for SHS loans with an average term of three years. 26 We also assume an implementation lag: year one loans use one-third of total available funds and by the third year the revolving fund is 23 Fabrication emissions are unlikely to be significant except for the pollution associated with providing energy to produce, distribute and install PV systems. At present, manufacturing energy payback times range from 0.5 to ten years depending on the type of PV technology, and the trend is towards faster payback. STAP/GEF Report, 1996. 24 World Bank Group (1996) . Note that PVMTI documentation refers to experience curve analysis to underscore the validity of this "demand-pull" approach. 25 The PVMTI figures in this paragraph are based on Kennedy (1998) . 26 Kennedy (1998) estimates that roughly 90% of the direct PV sales from PVMTI will be for SHSs though the exact MTP modalities are not yet finalized.
fully disbursed. Subsequently, PVMTI makes new loans with money released as the original loans are repaid (profits are assumed to be sufficient to cover any loan losses so the fund remains at $85 million).
Estimates for PV industry experience curve progress ratios range from 0.68 to 0.82 (see, for example, Figure 6 ); however, they cluster around 0.8 and this is the value we employ for the base case. 27 For 1998, we estimate an average PV module manufacturing cost of $3.65/Wp, annual production of 124MWp, and cumulative end-of-year production of 833MWp (Jensen, 1996) . Cumulative production of multi-junction thin-film amorphous PV modules is on the order of 10MWp. If amorphous modules follow their own experience curve, this implies that PVMTI's market transformation effect could be much stronger than our results indicate (Williams, 1998) . We do not distinguish between crystalline and amorphous panels in our analysis for conservatism and because there is not yet enough production history for amorphous modules to derive a reliable empirical progress ratio.
While we allow module costs to decline over time, we assume that all other costs are fixed at $350 per 50 Wp system. This is a highly conservative approach since it means the model does not allow for any direct or indirect experience effects for the non-module portion of the SHS costs. In fact, as any given local SHS market develops, experience effects should substantially reduce installation and balance of system costs. Data on the installed price of SHSs is not collected in any organized format, however, making it impossible to reliably analyze trends in the non-module cost elements of SHSs price. We further assume a 100% markup over factory costs for modules sold to final SHSs purchasers in developing countries, yielding a module price of $365 and an initial average system price of about $700.
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To account for the possibility that some portion of sales associated with PVMTI would have occurred even if the program were never implemented, we assume 27 Cody and Tiedje (1997) and Williams and Terzian (1993) Jensen (1996) confirmed a 0.82 progress ratio for all PV modules. Neij (1997) , cites a study showing a 0.79 progress ratio for crystalline modules in Japan during the 1979 to 1988 period. Finally, using his own database, Maycock (1996) calculates a progress ratio for global amorphous and crystalline PV of 0.68. We follow Neij (1997) in relying on the estimates that converge around 0.8. a free ridership rate of 10%, (FR=0.1). This is conservative given that the program is specifically designed to provide credit to capital constrained SHS purchasers and to encourage the development of SHS business models that have the potential for widespread replication. Thus, net of free drivers, the free ridership rate could be zero or even negative. Since the BCR varies linearly with free ridership, we do not present the sensitivity analysis in a figure; however, if the indirect demand effect and carbon benefit are included then the BCR for PVMTI remains above 1.0 as long as FR<0.24.
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Under the BAU scenario, we assume that PV sales grow at a 20% annual rate (Jensen, 1996) . Based on the 0.8 progress ratio, this exogenous sales growth generates sufficient cumulative production to drive module manufacturing costs down to $1.17/Wp in 2018. PVMTI can accelerate this trend both directly via additional sales induced by the program itself and indirectly due to feedback between the demand response and the experience curve effect. The model uses current PV module costs to determine the number of systems that can be financed in any given year. In accord with PVMTI goals, we estimate that the program directly catalyzes the purchase of 39,000 SHSs in its first year. 30 At an average size of 50Wp each, this increases PV sales by 1.9 MWp (Table 1) .
Over time, as module costs fall, PVMTI is able to finance more systems, peaking at 58,000 in 2018, or 2.9 MWp. This compares to 1995 SHSs sales of approximately 80,000 and a current total of about 400 million unelectrified homes (World Bank Group 1996) . Note that the indirect demand effect grows to exceed these direct effects by the year 2013. Accounting for indirect effects, PVMTI yields a BCR of 1.05, or 1.16 with a $10/tC carbon benefit.
As shown in Figure 7 these results are sensitive to changes in the ε p assumption. Higher ε p induces an exponential increase in the indirect demand effect, which, in turn, increases the BCR. We are not aware of any formal studies of elasticity for PV modules or electronic ballasts; however, both technologies are long-lived capital goods that provide electricity services.
28 Authors' estimate from data in Cabraal et al (1996) . 29 Kaufman (1998) provided important insights regarding carbon emissions from SHSs. 30 World Bank Group (1996) . Specifically, PVMTI will attempt to expand the demand for PV Kenya, Morocco, and India. In 1996, there were approximately 40,000 SHSs already installed in Kenya; 10,000 in Morocco; and 50,000 in India. Acker and Kammen (1996) and World Bank Group (1996) .
Consequently, we use long-run electricity elasticity as the best available proxy.
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Econometric estimates for the long-term own-price elasticity of demand for electricity vary substantially; however, most estimates exceed unity.
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Our base case analysis assumes that ε p =1 for both modules and ballasts. This is conservative in that, unlike electricity for consumers in industrialized countries, neither electronic ballasts nor PV modules are necessity goods (there are close substitutes available such as magnetic ballasts for the former or kerosene lamps for the latter).
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Assuming ε p =1 is particularly conservative since PVMTI may push PV prices past certain critical thresholds, thereby inducing a strong indirect demand effect. Marnay et al (1997) show that, at present, residential grid-connected PV systems are not economic even in those states with the most favorable adoption conditions. However if installed rooftop system costs were to fall to half their current level (to $3/Wp), then rooftop systems would be economical in 16% of detached single family households in the U.S. This represents a total market of 27,300 MWp, or over 200 times the current annual global PV market.
Similarly, UPVG (1994) estimates that bringing PV module costs below $3/Wp
would open up a 9,000 MWp market in U.S. on-grid applications, primarily in transmission and distribution support. Figure 8 demonstrates the sensitivity of our results to the assumed exogenous growth rate of 20%. As previously noted, using an exogenous growth rate defined as a percentage of current sales is equivalent to crediting PVMTI with a contagion effect resulting from the advertising and product information dissemination value of early product users. Over a range of exogenous growth rates between -30% and 50% the BCR is increasing if we account for the indirect demand effect. This occurs because the value of projected price decreases multiplied over a larger base of annual sales dominates the decreased 31 Short-run electricity elasticity estimates are lower than long-run estimates in large part because consumers cannot readily change their capital equipment in the short-run. This restriction does not apply for ballasts or SHSs since both represent equipment investments themselves rather than demand for electricity to power equipment. 32 Sweeney (1984) says that εp "probably exceeds unity" though his results are consistent with εp as low as 0.7. Beierlein et al (1981) report εp>2.0 for the residential and industrial sectors, but εp = 0.04 for commercial users. He explains the latter by the fact that commercial users mainly rely on lighting; however, this result may have changed given the availability of new energy efficient lighting technologies such as electronic ballasts. Sav (1984) reports a range of estimates in the literature ranging from εp=0.2 to εp=2.0, and he assumes a long-run elasticity of demand for energy services of 1.5.
marginal returns to industry experience associated with a larger cumulative level of sales.
34
Note, however, that if the indirect demand effect is not accounted for, the negative effect of diminishing returns to experience begins to dominate if the growth rate exceeds about 35%. The break-even point for PVMTI occurs when exogenous growth is approximately 18%, excluding carbon benefits, or 15% including a $10tC benefit. We include a negative growth rate to highlight the risk that PV will not maintain its expected diffusion trajectory (e.g. if a superior substitute emerges, dramatically reducing PV sales in all subsequent years). program would yield a 2.05% decline for that year. We note, however, that the PR may deteriorate sharply if artificial demand levels become too large. For example, if an expanded PVMTI induced a sufficiently sharp increase in short-33 Ruffin (1992) summarizes a large literature confirming that, in general, εp is low for essentials like food and water and high for more discretionary items like movie tickets and leisure travel. 34 In terms of equation (7), a faster increase in industry experience due to a higher exogenous growth rate reduces [(PMTP-PBAU)/(PBAU+ PMTP)/2] by less than the associated increase in (QBAU+ QMTP)/2. run demand this would increase short-run prices as firms struggled to use insufficiently capitalized manufacturing facilities to meet demand. More importantly, it may be hard for large MTPs to maintain allocative efficiency.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume an exogenous PR for our analysis since, in its current form, PVMTI expects to catalyze sales accounting for less than 1.4% of current PV sales, or less than 14% of current sales for the $300m
version (USDOC 1997, and World Bank Group 1996) .
To summarize, these results show that a $30 million PVMTI is small relative to the current and projected PV market; however, they also confirm that PVMTI has the potential to be cost-effective. While the results are sensitive to model parameter choice, our base case is conservative: § we do not attempt to estimate or account for the value of avoided environmental externalities other than carbon dioxide emissions; § we assume FR=0.1 despite the strong potential for free driver effects; § we do not model the possibility that amorphous PV modules will gain a large market share and rapidly decline in cost due to their much smaller cumulative production base and amenability to mass production; § we use a conservative ε p estimate; and, we do not account for quality of life improvements and other non-monetized effects.
The last factor may represent a key omission since SHSs provide key development benefits including pollution-free high quality light that is qualitatively far superior to kerosene lamps and other alternatives that it displaces (Acker and Kammen 1996) .
We now apply the same model to the case of a MTP that encourages the commercialization of energy efficient electronic ballasts for fluorescent lighting. In this case, however, we modify the model slightly to retrospectively assess the performance of a MTP.
35 Kennedy (1998) . Among other efforts, the World Bank Group has also initiated a $230 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Fund (REEF) that will support SHSs dissemination along with other technologies; a $7 million GEF investment in SHSs programs in Zimbabwe; and, a major Indonesian SHSs program ($24.3 million in GEF funds and a $20 World Bank loan).
Electronic Ballasts and the Environmental Protection Agency's Green Lights Program
Fluorescent tube lamps contain ballasts which convert electricity into the appropriate form to sustain fluorescent lamps. Ballasts initially contained magnetic components; however, during the mid-1980s, electronic ballasts entered the marketplace. Although more expensive than conventional ballasts, electronic ballasts are up to 40% more efficient and the energy savings from upgrading typically yield an excellent financial return. 36 Despite high rates of return for a low-risk investment, the majority of firms have still not chosen to invest in electronic ballasts. Recognizing a "win-win" opportunity to save companies money, improve economic performance and reduce emissions from electricity production, in 1991 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, established GL, a voluntary program that offers technical expertise and public relations benefits to encourage companies and organizations to become GL Partners (USEPA 1995).
In return, Partners agree to conduct comprehensive audits of all of their facilities and to retrofit any lighting for which the internal rate of return of the upgrade investment exceeds 20% (USEPA 1995). As noted in the introduction, through 1997, EPA has spent approximately $90 million to administer both GL 36 A single electronic ballast powering four T8 fluorescent tubes (one inch diameter T8s instead of conventional 1.5 inch diameter T12 tubes) saves 82 watts relative to a conventional fixture that uses a pair of two-lamp magnetic T12 ballasts. Assuming ten hours of use/day, this yields 300 kwhs of annual savings, or $30/year at $0.10/kwh. Including installation, upgrades cost $30-60/fixture depending on the exact configuration and volume level, implying a payback period of one to two years on equipment with an expected lifetime that exceeds 20 years. 37 Electronic ballasts still only accounted for 35% of all new ballasts sales in 1997. The trend is clearly towards increasing dominance, however, with corresponding percentages of 4% in 1990 , 9% in 1991 , 14% in 1992 , 23% in 1993 -94, and 31% in 1995 -96. Source: USDOC (1997 and Energy Star Buildings (which was launched in 1996 to extend the GL model to non-lighting loads).
Electronic ballasts began to have a significant impact on the U.S. commercial lighting market during the mid-1980s. GL did not contribute to this process until 1991; however, as of 1997 about $220 million worth of electronic ballasts had been purchased as part of GL, accounting for 9% of sales that year.
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In addition to fluorescent lamps, GL encourages a range of different efficient lighting technologies; however, a large share of the program has been devoted to electronic ballasts because fluorescent lighting is ubiquitous and the upgrade economics are compelling. We estimate that 50% of EPA's GL/Energy Star Buildings budget has been devoted to promoting electronic ballasts under GL, or $45 million through 1997. Figure 10 shows the historical relationship between price and cumulative production for electronic ballasts, and the associated progress ratio estimate of 0.89. 39 We then generate a "backcast" (Figure 11 ) by using actual cumulative production levels from 1986 to 1997 to compute the predicted unit price for each year (assuming the progress ratio was fixed and exactly correct). This "smoothed" price history can then be compared against an estimate made using actual production levels minus all electronic ballasts installed by GL Partners (the "no GL" scenario in Table 2 ). This estimates how far down the industry experience curve the GL program has pushed electronic ballasts. As of 1997, GL's direct impact had reduced the current price of electronic ballasts by $0.18 per ballast or 1.2%. However, as in the PV case, the direct price reduction caused by GL has induced an increase in the quantity demanded by all potential electronic ballast customers, including both GL Partners and all other customers. Accounting for indirect demand effects, GL reduced the 1997 price of ballasts by $0.20, or 1.4%.
Some Partners who purchased electronic ballasts might have purchased upgrades even if GL had never existed, i.e. they were free riders. A comprehensive survey of utility demand-side management programs showed 38 Calculated based on self-reported electronic ballast purchases by GL Partners from Lewis (1998) . 39 The data for this calculation are from the USDOC (1997) and the methodology is identical to that described for PV.
average free ridership rates of 12.2%, with a standard deviation of 11.4%.
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However, a recent EPA study indicates that GL Partners fail to report about one-third of the total lighting upgrades they undertake (Lewis 1998) . Also, there may be free drivers such as companies that do not become Partners but nonetheless use GL technical information or lighting engineers trained by GL.
Thus, on balance, our base case assumption that free ridership is 10% (FR= .1) is conservative. Since the effect of FR on the BCR is linear, we do not show the sensitivity analysis; however, as long as the indirect demand effect and a carbon benefit are included, the BCR remains above 1.0 for FR<=0.65.
As with PVMTI, for our base case, we employ a 20-year time frame (though we also show historical data from five years prior to initiating the program in 1991) and assume ε p =1. Given that the electronic ballast market is closer to saturation than PV, we assume a more modest exogenous sales growth rate of 5%. Finally, we proceed, contrary to fact, as though the program shut down after 1997. This allows us to estimate the present value of both benefit and cost streams associated with running the program for seven years and then continuing to account for the on-going dynamic benefits for the remaining 13 years in our standard 20 year analytic time frame. We define all present value calculations using 1991, the initial year of the program, as our reference point.
Accounting for indirect demand effects yields an estimated BCR of 1.26, or 2.33 including a $10/tC benefit (Table 2 ). In contrast, the scenario that removes the direct GL sales but does not account for dynamic demand effects shows a substantially reduced BCR of 1.04 or 1.90 with the carbon benefit.
These results are sensitive to the assumed exogenous growth rate, with faster growth generating a higher BCR, particularly when the carbon benefit is included ( Figure 12 ). The ε p assumption also affects the GL analysis in a manner analogous to the PVMTI case, with higher ε p causing an exponentially higher BCR when the indirect demand effect is accounted for (Figure 13 ). Moreover, beyond a certain level, faster progress means that the absolute price differential between the BAU and program scenarios narrows more quickly and this reduces the BCR of GL unless both indirect demand effects and the carbon benefit are included (Figure 14) . The progress ratio sensitivity analysis for GL is distinctive; however, in that negative returns to faster progress are more severe. For PVMTI, faster progress unambiguously increased the BCR as long as indirect demand effects were accounted for; however, for GL, even with indirect demand effects, faster progress begins to reduce the BCR for progress ratios lower than 0.87. Nonetheless, if both carbon benefits and indirect demand effects are included, faster progress always increases the BCR.
As with PVMTI, the model indicates that the GL program is cost-effective;
however, the magnitude of the positive BCR is sensitive to parameter choice.
Consequently, we also apply conservative assumptions to this case: § we employ conservative estimates for ε p , and the exogenous growth rate;
and, § we do not account for energy savings or lighting quality improvements associated with electronic ballasts.
The most important conservative assumption in this case is the omission of energy savings. These cost savings are worth over $500 million in net present value terms, or roughly an order of magnitude more than our benefits measure. 41 They accrue to private economic agents (GL Partners); nonetheless, they may legitimately be considered part of total social benefits. We exclude these benefits to ensure that our analysis is congruent with the approach used to assess PVMTI and to highlight the significance of indirect demand effects. The fact that GL yields a strongly positive BCR, even with these extremely conservative assumptions indicates that the program has been highly costeffective.
Fuel Ethanol
Starting in 1978, the federal government initiated a MTP to promote the use of corn ethanol as a transportation fuel. The program exempted gasoline containing ethanol from a portion of the federal gasoline excise tax. The 41 Lewis (1998) estimates that, through 1997, GL Partners invested over $1.5 billion in energy efficiency upgrades while saving over $500 million in annual electricity costs by 1997. Attributing half of this activity to electronic ballasts, and prorating both the investments and electricity savings over the 1991 to 1997 period (in accordance with reported upgrade activity), yields a net present value of $560 million (with r=.05 and n=20 years). 
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However, as noted above, this may not be significant due to omitted EOS effects.
Unlike the previous two case studies, however, the ethanol MTP has not produced net social benefits. Estimating the exact net social costs of the ethanol MTP is difficult because the precise shape of the ethanol demand curve is unknown; however, we can bound the possible results. First, assume that the long-run marginal cost is essentially flat. This is consistent with Crooks (1997) who argues that cash operating costs for small (less than 30 million gallons per year) plants are only about 5% higher than for large plants. Moreover, he suggests that five of the most recent "state-of-the art" ethanol plants have had average capacities of just over seven million gallons per year. Crooks also discusses a range of possible technological improvements, but makes no mention of any cost-savings potential from building larger ethanol plants. To the extent that input prices are relatively inelastic to marginal changes in 42 Taxation rate chronology from GAO (1997:2) . Annual fuel ethanol use derived from FHWA(1995), FHWA(1996 ) and FHWA(1997 ) assuming 10% average gasohol blend during 1980 -1992 Price data are cited with permission from "Oxy-Fuel News" published by Hart Publications, Inc. Price data are available only for 1989 to the present; however, it is possible to construct a valid experience curve for this period since cumulative production numbers are available since 1980 and large volume production did not begin until 1982.
44 Goldemberg (1996) shows a bifurcated experience curve for the Brazilian bagasse ethanol market, with PR=0.70 from 1980 to 1990 and PR=0.90 from 1990 to 1995. A massive Brazilian MTP has allowed current ethanol production to exceed three billion gallons per year, though wholesale prices remain high at roughly US$1.30 per gallon. This is more than twice current U.S. production levels and matches prevailing wholesale prices in the U.S. of $1.20 per gallon.
ethanol production levels, we can assume constant returns to scale and an essentially flat long-run marginal cost curve.
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The real price of wholesale ethanol fell by 23% between 1989 and 1997 (as cumulative production increased by 157%); however, even at the 1997 price, ethanol production would cease if the federal tax subsidy were removed.
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Assuming a stable ethanol demand schedule, the fact that ethanol production costs were higher in previous years means that in no period between 1980 and the present has any portion of the ethanol demand curve exceeded the unsubsidized marginal cost of ethanol.
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The upper-bound dead-weight loss estimate for the program is therefore the present value of the stream of annual subsidies. Figure 15 shows this for one year as the rectangle ABCD, with the triangle ACD representing the extent of DWL over-counting under this simplification.
Thus, an ex post evaluation of the fuel ethanol program to date yields a BCR of zero. The net present value, using 1980 as the reference year, falls somewhere between zero and negative $4 billion. The true net present value is, however, closer to the pessimistic estimate. This follows because the fuel ethanol demand curve for quantities similar to or lower than current consumption levels is likely to be highly elastic since very close substitutes (e.g. gasoline and other octane enhancers) are readily available. Thus, the triangle ACD in Figure 15 should be small and the producer surplus from ethanol production is likely to be minimal.
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It is also worth noting that, while indirect demand effects have helped to drive the observed increase in quantity demanded under the ethanol 45 USGAO(1997:2) estimates that, prior to the Federal Agriculture Improvement Reform of 1996, completely eliminating the ethanol subsidy would eliminate all production, reducing corn demand by 6% and corn prices by 6 to 9%. Thus, the true LRMC would likely have a slight positive slope due to input cost effects. 46 USGAO(1997:2) estimates that "without the [federal excise tax exemption] incentives, ethanol fuel production would largely discontinue." Similarly, Crooks (1997) estimates that without the federal tax subsidy, ethanol could not compete even if corn were free unless crude oil prices were at least $25/barrel. Finally, Long et al (1997) Crooks(1997) indicates that the top three ethanol producers controlled 63% of production capacity in 1995, indicating reason for concern about market concentration. USGAO(1997:2) indicates that the data for estimating the size of any potential producer surplus in this industry are simply not available; however, under our plausible assumption of highly elastic demand, market concentration would not translate into large monopoly rents.
program, this does not change the fact that none of this production has yielded net social benefits.
As the ethanol MTP continues, there will be additional social losses each year until the MC of the cheapest ethanol produced falls below a large enough share of the demand curve to start generating net social benefits. Without unobtainable detailed knowledge of the fuel ethanol demand schedule, it is impossible to forecast precisely when this might occur. Given an elastic demand curve for fuel ethanol and a progress ratio of about 0.83, one might expect current ethanol sales to approach 10% of gasoline sales, the maximum percentage eligible for the full federal tax subsidy. It is therefore surprising that direct and indirect experience effects have not driven ethanol demand higher than its currently level of just over 1% of total highway gasoline sales. One plausible explanation is that investments in grain ethanol production facilities are extremely risky, a point underscored by Crooks (1997) .
The federal tax incentive has been modified three times since 1978 and it is constantly under threat of elimination. Moreover, grain and fossil fuel prices are extremely volatile. This is consistent with the observation that recent grain ethanol production facilities have been built by corn growers' cooperatives that have complex political and economic motives. Moreover, ethanol production facilities are concentrated in agricultural states offering substantial state level incentives on top of the generous federal subsidy.
In sum, the corn ethanol MTP has not yielded positive benefits to date, and it appears highly unlikely that it will do so in the future. One important lesson to draw from this experience is that MTPs cannot be cost-effective if too much time and total investment is necessary before subsidized production lowers costs below market demand. Fuel ethanol lacked substantial niche markets, and the initial cost of production at the start of the MTP was very high relative to consumer willingness to pay. Consequently, very large subsidies were necessary to prompt any ethanol sales and the progress ratio has not been sufficiently favorable to reduce production costs below the unsubsidized market demand schedule even after nearly 20 years of costly government support.
This result also confirms the particular risks involved with initiating MTPs for mature technologies. Morris (1993) reports that total ethanol production in the late 1850s exceeded 90 million gallons; however, production dropped after 1861 when ethanol became subject to a $2.08 liquor tax which was not lifted until 1906. He further explains that ethanol production peaked again at ten million gallons per year in 1914 and was used widely both as a fuel and especially as a manufacturing input until Prohibition began in 1919. Finally, Crooks (1997) reports that modern fuel ethanol production technology is essentially the same as the equipment and processes used by the beverage and industrial alcohol industries. Consequently, the relevant experience curve for the fuel ethanol that started in the late 1970s may really have been one that reflected the long history and large cumulative production from these closely related industries. Taking this into account should have indicated that rapid cost reduction progress was unlikely (an interpretation bolstered by the extreme sensitivity of the ethanol PR estimate to inclusion of current industry production as an exogenous variable). In conjunction with the large gap between production costs and market demand, the relative maturity of the ethanol industry should have been sufficient grounds for deep skepticism about the fuel ethanol MTP from its inception.
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a novel analytic framework for assessing the full impact of MTPs on new technology commercialization rates. Our model employs experience curve and demand theory to estimate the BCR of a new MTP (PVMTI) as well as to retrospectively evaluate a MTP that has been operational since 1991 (GL). Our novel benefit-cost methodology improves over existing MTP evaluation strategies by accounting for indirect demand effects.
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Even under conservative assumptions, we show that the cumulative indirect effect from GL and PVMTI exceed direct program impacts. Thus, failure to account for indirect demand effects will result in MTP impact assessments that are systematically pessimistic. Given the central importance of new technology diffusion rates for both environmental quality and economic productivity, it is important to eliminate this bias against MTPs.
Our preliminary results indicate that MTPs may prove useful; however, this does not diminish the dangers inherent in trying to pick technology "winners."
As with any extrapolative exercise, caution is necessary in interpreting our quantitative results. Industry experience curves for many products have been Assuming 0% spillover and r=0% then the firm's true marginal cost at time t is equal to MC(q(T)) defined as the marginal cost of final unit to be produced. Derived from Spence (1981) .
Figure 2: Experience Curve Terminology
Learning and experience curve terminology matrix. Illustrates prima facia case for considering MTPs for technologies characterized by an experience curve, regardless of the level of spillover.
Figure 4: Two-Period Dynamic Welfare Analysis of MTPs
A stylized two-period partial equilibrium welfare analysis. The MTP lasts only one period but induces a period-two welfare gain by shifting the marginal production cost schedule downward. In fact, a single period MTP induces an infinite stream of future period benefits; however, later period benefits are generally less significant than near-term MTP benefits both because of discounting and gradual dampening of the positive feedback between demand and experience. This figure also shows the theoretical minimum possible MTP cost represented as the lowest total subsidy that could induce a given increase in the quantity demanded during period 1. This would require optimal allocation of subsidies and zero administrative costs.
Figure 5: MTP Subsidy Efficiency
Shows the minimum possible cost for a MTP that induces a given amount of incremental demand. Then illustrates the additional cost (in increasing order) if the program is unable to price discriminate, if it fails to prevent free riders, and if it subsidizes some consumers with relatively low willingness to pay. Plot of module price against cumulative production in ln-ln space showing a reasonable approximation to an idealized industry experience curve. We confirm Williams' calculations using ordinary least squares regression in the form of equation (2) to derive b, the experience parameter. Substituting this coefficient estimate into equation (3) yields a best estimate progress ratio of 0.82. We also calculate a 95% confidence interval for the progress ratio (0.81 to 0.83) based on the underlying 95% confidence interval for the OLS coefficient estimate for b. Source: (Williams, 1993) . Detailed model results for our base case PVMTI scenario. The BCR over a 20-year time frame is positive if we account for the indirect demand effect.
Figure 7: Sensitivity of BCR to Elasticity for PVMTI
The positive relationship between ε p and the indirect demand effect (shown in Figure 7 ) drives an analogous positive and exponential relationship between ε p and BCR.
Figure 8: Sensitivity of BCR to Exogenous Growth Rate for PVMTI
If we account for the indirect demand effect, PVMTI's BCR is increasing (at a diminishing rate) over the range of positive exogenous growth rate estimates. Excluding the indirect demand response, higher growth forecasts yield higher BCR initially, but diminishing returns to experience ultimately override the positive compounding influence of faster growth. We also include negative growth rate estimates to simulate the possibility that PV diffusion will be unexpectedly cut short. Plot of electronic ballast price against cumulative production in ln-ln space (source: U.S. Census Department). It reasonably approximates an idealized industry experience curve. The best estimate for the progress ratio is 0.89 while the 95% confidence interval (0.87 to 0.91) is derived using the same approach described in Figure 9 .
Figure 11: Actual vs. Predicted Electronic Ballast Cost
Actual ballast prices (in constant 1997$) as well as "backcast" predicted prices based on the industry experience curve for electronic ballasts.
Table 2: Green Lights Program Base Case
Detailed model results for our base case GL scenario. The BCR over a 20-year time frame is significantly positive even without accounting for the indirect demand effect or any carbon benefit.
Figure 12: Sensitivity of GL BCR to Exogenous Growth Rate
The BCR for GL is increasing (at a slowly diminishing rate) with the exogenous growth rate.
Figure 13: Sensitivity of GL BCR to Exogenous Elasticity
As with PVMTI, a sharply positive relationship exists between ε p and BCR due to the effect of ε p on the indirect demand effect (though there is no relationship if we exclude the indirect demand effect).
Figure 14: Sensitivity of GL BCR to Progress Ratio
BCR is maximized at a progress ratio of ~0.88 if we account for the indirect demand effect but exclude carbon benefits. With a $10/tC benefit, BCR monotonically increases with faster progress.
Figure 15: Ethanol Market
Assuming constant returns to scale, linear demand and that no consumers are willing to pay more than the current MC of ethanol, this figure shows the most optimistic case for the ethanol program. Even if the consumers with the highest demand are willing to pay just short of the current cost of $1.19 the program's future is bleak. If the subsidy were gradually scaled back so that the quantity demanded remained at current levels as MC fell, then MC would have to fall by half of the current $0.54 per gallon subsidy to first equalize the annual DWL and consumer surplus and then begin generating net benefits. Our analysis indicates this will not occur until after 2013 at current production rates.
